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Reconstructing Trust in Sierra Leone 
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ABSTRACT In 2004, Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
reported that building public trust in Sierra Leone’s post-conflict government and 
political system was a precondition for development in all sectors of society. This 
article assesses progress in this venture, and finds that problems of deep distrust 
continue to pervade all levels of socio-political interaction in Sierra Leone. 
Nevertheless, the manner in which political trust is conceptualised in Sierra Leone is 
changing as traditional inequitable systems of patronage are gradually rejected. 
Noting this trend, it is a central argument of this article that the channelling of 
prevailing political cynicism into mechanisms of accountability, combined with the 
earning of public trust by exemplary political leaders, represents the most effective 
way to reconstruct trust in government, the political system, and throughout Sierra 
Leone in general.  
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Trust in government leads to respect for the political system. Respect for the political 
system ensures stability. Stability is a precondition for development in all sectors of 
society. Trust in government has to be earned by government and, in particular, by the 
leaders of government.i 
(Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2004) 
 
I don’t trust anyone. The government have failed in all the promises they said they were 
going to do for us. We have seen nothing. They can say anything to get in power, but as 
soon as they get in power, they forget about us.ii  
(David, security guard, Freetown, January 2009)  
 
If the leaders change their behaviour, if they change their ways, everything will be fine. 
Because we have diamonds, we have gold, we have everything.iii 
(Mohamed, ex-combatant taxi-driver, Freetown, January 2009) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In 2004, Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) published its 
final report on the causes and consequences of the 1991-2002 civil conflict. It showed 
that many driving forces of conflict related to a prior break down of trust; both with 
regard to popular disillusionment with traditional political mechanisms and state 
institutions, and with regard to a deep social schism between Sierra Leone’s youth 
and older generations. If these issues played a part in fostering conflict, conflict itself 
served to further undermine trust across all levels, leading the TRC to conclude that 
trust-building remained central to the overall project of rebuilding Sierra Leone: 
 
There is very little trust in leadership […] This breakdown in the relationship between 
citizen and state does not bode well for the future. People's spirits have been broken by 
the horrors they endured during the conflict. The leaders should urgently address this 
lack of trust, for it can only be a source of further strife and unrest.iv 
 
Now, seven years after conflict, five years after the TRC’s findings, and more than a 
year after landmark national elections, is Sierra Leone in a better situation? Building 
on fieldwork conducted between September 2008 - March 2009, this article shows 
that Sierra Leone continues to suffer from deep problems of distrust.1 Pervasive 
corruption, lack of economic development and a failure to deliver on election 
promises continue to promulgate deep political cynicism towards government and 
                                                 
i Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, Vol.2, Ch.3, item 212. 
ii Interview, Freetown, 22 January 2009. 
iii Interview, Freetown, 27 January 2009. 
iv Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, Vol.2, Ch.4, item 48. 
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political leaders. Yet the question of trust goes beyond the simple matter of relations 
between citizen and state. Those interviewed identified issues of trust on a 
fundamental interpersonal level, commonly linked to perceived ‘bad’ attitudes among 
others and the proclivity of individuals to place money before duty and fair-play. Past 
examples of betrayal, disappointment or injustice, accompanied the conviction that 
ultimately, ‘to trust is foolish.’v  
 
Trust, in this article, follows the definition commonly provided by those interviewed; 
a faith in individuals or institutions to meet obligations and, more negatively, to avoid 
betrayal. This conception was strongly shaped by traditional systems of socio-
political interaction in which powerful patrons controlled capital. Trust focussed upon 
individuals over and above institutions; family and community networks were 
deemed significant, although in decline. Informal networks were blamed for 
undermining trust by promoting corruption and nepotism, excluding many Sierra 
Leoneans and eroding public confidence in the equal distribution of opportunities and 
national resources. Post-conflict efforts to counter corruption meant such networks 
were also increasingly unreliable for those who traditionally reaped their benefit. 
These findings supported an International Crisis Group (ICG) report which partly saw 
2007 elections as ‘a mass vote for better governance and service delivery over the 
failed promises of patronage.’vi As traditional patronage networks and community ties 
were seen to decline, more cautiously individualistic formulations and investments of 
trust had grown; confidence could only be invested on an individual-to-individual 
basis, and only once an individual had proven their commitment to fulfil promises 
and act with integrity.  
 
Despite the proliferation of political cynicism and a negative perception of popular 
attitudes, this article finds that recent political developments offer hope for change. In 
particular, the promotion of political accountability, combined with leader’s 
commitments to actively earn public confidence, serves to deconstruct traditional 
inequitable patrimonial systems, paving the way for the reconstruction of trust across 
all levels of socio-political interaction.  
                                                 
v Interview with security guard, aged 21. Freetown, 28 January 2009. This statement was echoed 
frequently in interviews. 
vi ICG, A New Era of Reform? p6. See also Ch. II, pp5-8, ‘The Decline of Patronage?’. 
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The Development of Distrust 
 
The situation in Sierra Leone is inextricably linked with long-established informal 
systems of governance and social interaction. From the earliest days of colonial 
government, political authority and trade relied upon a patrimonial system in which 
Freetown-based political patrons operated within elite socio-economic networks, 
alienating much of the rural provincial population.2 Following independence in 1961, 
nepotism and corruption within a growing shadow state and fenced-off economy 
further undermined trust in the formal organs of state. As political elites exercised 
power for private gain in both local and national government, the wider development 
of the country stalled and the majority of the population became politically and 
economically marginalised.  
 
Trust in the formal political system was further undermined in the 1970s and 1980s as 
Sierra Leone slipped into a one-party system of government and President Siaka 
Stevens moved to suppress political opposition. As student protests were quashed and 
the dominance of local chiefs reinforced, youth became increasingly marginalised and 
disillusioned with traditional modes of government.3 Whilst the official state was 
failing them, the informal state, built upon patronage networks, was excluding them. 
 
It was precisely such disillusionment and break down of trust in leaders that the TRC 
identified as key to rendering Sierra Leone vulnerable to conflict in 1991, yet the 
conflict itself served to further undermine bonds of trust within Sierra Leonean 
society. Older generations came to fear and distrust youth, who were believed to be 
the driving force of rebellion, whilst many fighting for the rebel Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) or the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) felt betrayed by an unsupportive 
civilian population.4 Confidence in government was undermined by the inability of 
leaders to mount an effective counter-offence to the RUF, whilst repeated military 
coups served to erode confidence in the salience of democracy. Coups also led 
civilians to treat military forces with suspicion, a problem compounded by the 
perceived collusion of the army with rebels, epitomised by the term ‘sobel’ – soldier 
by day, rebel by night.5 With the blurring of lines of division between supposedly 
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opposing forces, and consistent abuses against civilians by all sides, the war in Sierra 
Leone established a logic whereby it became a matter of self-survival to be 
distrustful.  
 
 
Same Car, Different Driver? 
 
With the end of conflict in 2002, success in reintegrating ex-combatants into wider 
society appears to have been considerable. This owes much to a reconciliatory 
attitude among the population and fighting factions, with most wishing to put the 
conflict behind them and focus on the future. The desire of many former RUF to 
distance themselves from their ‘rebel’ identity has also facilitated their acceptance 
into communities.6  Yet perhaps the most important reason for the relative ease with 
which factions returned to wider society relates to the root causes of the war; conflict 
was not driven by deeply entrenched ethnic, political, or regional divides. Rather, the 
stated grievances for which many combatants claimed to be fighting were also held 
by the victims of violence and those pushing for peace. Hence, the integration of ex-
combatants and their reconciliation with each other and the wider community has in 
many respects represented a far easier task than that faced in many other civil wars. 
Nevertheless, precisely those same grievances which have united Sierra Leoneans 
continue to foster broader problems of political distrust. Commonly-held feelings of 
disillusionment and frustration with government and leaders, seen as instrumental to 
nurturing conflict, have survived conflict.  
 
Many of those interviewed expressed dismay at the post-conflict return of the same 
distrusted political elites and abusive practices that had led to war. Anger over broken 
electoral promises was tangible, as was a feeling among ex-combatants that promised 
dividends of peace had not materialised.7 A common belief that little had changed 
since the end of the conflict was not entirely unjustified; Sierra Leone remained 
rooted to the foot of the UN Human Development Index, suffering high 
unemployment levels and lacking the most basic infrastructure required for 
significant economic development. Corruption at all levels remained rife, and the 
traditional informal mechanisms of business and politics continued to hold primacy. 
Individuals commonly reported that to make gains in life required knowing people of 
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influence or relying on the assistance of connected family members; personal skills 
and merit were deemed largely irrelevant. After two successive elections since the 
war, it was therefore not surprising that many Sierra Leoneans remained deeply 
cynical towards political leaders. David, a young security guard in Freetown, voiced a 
commonly held view: 
 
You can be trusted now, but when you enter into politics, you don’t have any trust.  It is 
like we say in Krio, ‘politricks’, because you can trick the people so that you can sit at the 
right position. But when you sit in that chair, you betray the people.vii  
 
A frequently expressed view was that politicians sought to profit from office, rather 
than serve the people; even for those few who might hold good intentions, it was 
believed that the corrupting influence of wealth would inevitably lead them to neglect 
their duties: 
 
The moment they sit on that chair, the moment they swear them in, the moment they 
give them that position as minister, it is finished.viii 
 
When they enter into power, they always neglect people. They don’t want to see the 
people. When they get the money they send their families overseas to go and learn 
there and sit there. They build a mighty house, buy cars, live a luxurious life, while the 
people are suffering.ix   
 
The 2007 elections were seen as an opportunity to counter such cynicism and build 
faith in the political system, and in many key aspects there were positive signs for this 
endeavour. Following a high voter turn-out, the incumbent Sierra Leone People’s 
Party (SLPP) lost the election to the All People’s Congress (APC), a result many saw 
as a response to the SLPP’s failure to deliver promised change. Despite spates of 
electoral violence in the run-up to a second round of voting, power was transferred 
peacefully under the successful guidance of Sierra Leone’s own National Electoral 
Commission (NEC) and the national police force. The APC’s Ernest Bai Koroma, 
elected on a youth and anti-corruption ticket, assumed office vowing to bring tangible 
change.  
                                                 
vii Interview, Freetown, 22 January 2009. 
viii Interview with Joseph, driver for a development agency, Freetown, 27 January 2009. 
ix Interview with Musa, taxi driver, Freetown, 30 January 2009. 
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Nevertheless, more than a year after the APC assumed power, progress in building 
trust appears to have been severely limited. Prior to the 2007 election, a survey by the 
BBC World Service Trust and Search for Common Ground found that many Sierra 
Leoneans felt there was little difference between the parties, and that the democratic 
system in practice offered very little choice in terms of policy.x In early 2009, 
cynicism towards the parties reflected the same sentiment: 
 
All the parties are the same. The SLPP, the PMDC, the APC, they are the same. The 
same people in SLPP, you can see them in APC. The same people in APC, you can see 
them in PMDC. That is why I say it is ‘politricks’. They play a trick on people so that 
they can get their own money.xi   
 
Whilst the reversal of such attitudes cannot be expected overnight, a number of 
developments during and after the 2007 elections can be seen as partly responsible for 
their prevalence.  
 
First, a real sense that election promises have not been honoured has served to foster 
deep resentment towards government. For many, the change in government 
represented a last gamble, and hopes among youths and ex-combatants for an 
improved lot were particularly high.8 Nevertheless, most find themselves in the same 
situation as before; new employment opportunities have not materialised, and youth-
empowerment initiatives remain stalled at the starting blocks. This perceived 
continuity of stagnation has done much to reinforce the idea of ‘same car, different 
driver.’  
 
Second, the elections themselves saw the return of past abusive political practices and 
the development of a highly confrontational political atmosphere, both of which 
served to undermine trust.9 Incidents of corruption were reported; ‘votes for sale’ 
took on a highly visible presence as voters queued outside candidate’s homes to 
receive their payments.10 Rival politicians, and most notably, the rival presidential 
candidates, accused their opponents of seeking to rig the election or intimidate the 
                                                 
x BBC World Service Trust and Search for Common Ground, Sierra Leone Elections 2007, pp19-20. 
xi Interview with security guard, Freetown, 22 January 2009. 
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electorate. At one juncture, departing president Ahmed Tejan Kabbah threatened to 
impose a state of emergency in the country unless party supporters desisted from 
violent acts, and APC leader Ernest Bai Koroma was forced to abandon campaigning 
in the south.xii Such was the level of distrust between parties that Kabbah was unable 
to bring the contending candidates together for a joint rally calling for peaceful 
electioneering.   
 
The involvement of former combatants in the private security arrangements of 
political parties also spoke volumes about trust during the elections. Ex-combatants 
themselves believed they had been called upon by the parties because politicians 
could not trust the police or army.xiii Political leaders claimed that party militias were 
a necessary defensive measure against the physical intimidation practiced by 
opponents.11 Following elections, party militias continued to be involved in acts of 
political violence.12 The reconnection of ex-combatants to violence through the very 
operation of the democratic system represented a worrying mirror of political abuses 
common under the pre-conflict Siaka Stevens regime. Again, this has reinforced the 
notion of ‘same car, different driver.’ 
  
Finally, the risk that parties, and political life in Sierra Leone in general, exacerbate 
regional divisions was partly realised during the 2007 elections. Although the 
emergence of a third party, the People’s Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC), 
served to bring many traditionally SLPP Mende voters to the Temne-reliant APC, the 
difficulties encountered by the APC in campaigning in parts of the south betrayed the 
fact that Sierra Leone remained regionally divided.13 Since elections, the PMDC has 
floundered and its support is expected to swing back to the SLPP. Furthermore, 
President Koroma, in keeping with past administrations, has moved to fill 
government with appointments from his northern support-base, raising fears that 
Sierra Leone will again see a situation in which Freetown’s ruling elite is 
disconnected from, and distrusted by, the largely Mende areas of the rural South and 
                                                 
xii BBC, Emergency Threat in Sierra Leone, 28 August 2007, BBC News Online,  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6966339.stm ; IRIN, Sierra Leone: Election  tensions could help or 
hinder democratic process, Freetown, 29 August 2007, 
http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=73994.  
xiii See Utas & Christensen, Mercenaries of Democracy, p7. 
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East.xiv The rise of regionalism in party political interaction has therefore served to 
reinvigorate old problems of distrust. 
 
 
Reconstructing Trust 
 
Despite problems encountered during the 2007 elections, the eventual peaceful 
transfer of power and change in government represented a victory for the democratic 
vote. Many of those interviewed who voted APC, often for the first time, expressed 
hope in President Koroma, and most agreed he had entered office with genuine 
conviction to bring change for the people. Nevertheless, few expected the President to 
achieve this aim. It was felt that Sierra Leone’s history showed the trappings of power 
ultimately corrupted all leaders, and that those surrounding the president would 
obstruct his progress. Mariama, an APC supporter, stated:     
 
For the President, we are praying that he will have more trust in his heart. But for the 
ministers, most of them are not trustworthy. Even the people in the country are not 
trustworthy.xv  
 
That ‘the people’ were not trustworthy, Mariama explained, referred to the unreliable 
attitude of ordinary Sierra Leoneans, a criticism often voiced in interviews. In this 
respect the concept of corruption was often applied not solely to the workings of 
systems and institutions but to character, both a perceived national character and the 
attitude of individuals.14 The question of trust, therefore, ran deeper than a simple 
matter of faith in politicians and government, as the comments of Joseph, a driver for 
a development agency, showed:  
 
I don’t trust anybody. No friends, no family. Nobody. I trust myself. In this country, people 
don’t trust people because of so many things. Business, money – people betray people for 
money, people kill people for position. So how can you trust people?xvi 
 
                                                 
xiv International Crisis Group, Sierra Leone: A New Era of Reform? pp11-12 
xv Interview, Freetown, 30 January 2009. 
xvi Interview, Freetown, 29 January 2009. Whilst others expressed some trust in close family, virtually 
all believed friends would betray them for money and they could only truly rely upon themselves.  
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Many of those interviewed gave a series of examples from their own lives in which 
they had been ‘betrayed’ by colleagues, friends and family, usually in connection to 
money. Individuals cited day-to-day experiences of corruption and nepotism in 
seeking employment, the non-payment of wages, the breaking of contracts and the 
collusion of police officers with criminals. Given such experiences, individuals 
explained their reluctance to hold faith in political leaders as a simple matter of 
common sense. A sentiment of ‘We don’t trust ourselves, so how can we trust in 
democracy’ was similarly noted by Utas and Christensen.xvii 
 
If the problem of distrust is as endemic as many Sierra Leoneans believe, then the 
question remains as to how political leaders can tackle such a seemingly impossible 
task as rebuilding trust in government, as prescribed by the TRC. Two approaches 
offer real hope in this regard. 
 
First, the statement of the TRC chairman points towards the most straightforward 
solution to problems of distrust: 
 
The leadership must know that the trust and confidence of the people is not automatic; 
it is earned through honesty and lost through corruption and greed.xviii 
 
Quite simply, trust in government and political leaders can be built in Sierra Leone 
through the example of competent individuals in public office. The importance of 
public examples of leaders resistant to corruption and dedicated to serving the people 
was highlighted in interviews as the only way to bring real change in attitudes across 
all levels of social interaction in Sierra Leone.  If even one or two public figures were 
able to earn the trust of the people, it was suggested, the impact on self-perceptions 
across the country would be significant. 
 
The impact that individual examples can make should not be underestimated, as 
evidenced by case of NEC Commissioner Christiana Thorpe.15 Recognised 
internationally for her determination and integrity during the 2007 elections, many of 
those interviewed explained their confidence in the vote and their power to change 
                                                 
xvii Utas & Christensen, Mercenaries of Democracy, p22. 
xviii Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, Vol.3B, Ch.8, My National Vision for Sierra 
Leone: A Renaissance Sierra Leone, by Bishop Joseph C. Humper.. 
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government as stemming in large part from their confidence in Commissioner 
Thorpe:  
 
We know the person that’s holding the position, she is trustworthy. People have 
worked with her, she has a respect for herself.xix  
 
If the woman [Christiana Thorpe] is here still, everything will be fine. For that 
particular woman, for every election that she is going to be conducting, it is going to be 
fine.xx 
 
Second, trust-building in government (and indeed, elections) cannot rely solely on the 
emergence of good leaders. For one, this would risk people investing trust solely in 
individuals rather than the system as a whole. Therefore, the development and 
reinforcement of accountability mechanisms and systems of regulation would in itself 
serve to reward and encourage sound leadership and build faith in the political 
system. This allows for a practical implementation of attitudinal change, a project 
which otherwise remains abstract and difficult to measure progress upon.16  
 
In the formal political arena, the casting of votes of no confidence has built 
confidence in the vote, reinforcing the determination of the electorate to hold leaders 
to account. Indeed, despite an insistence that government and political leaders could 
not be trusted, those interviewed clearly held confidence their votes could bring about 
a change in government, punishing those who had failed to deliver on promises:  
 
You cannot betray me, and then when the next election comes, you tell me to vote for 
you. No, I cannot vote for you. I will vote for another person, so I can watch him.xxi 
 
They cannot say a lot of things in a conference, or when they meet the people, saying 
that when I become a minister I will bring a project that has a lot of jobs. Then when 
you see them in the chair, there is no project, and no jobs. What do you want the people 
to say?  That bad man, we vote for him, and now he’s sitting on that chair treating us 
like slaves. Don’t worry, the next election, he will not sit on that chair.xxii 
 
                                                 
xix Interview with ex-combatant, Freetown, 28 January 2009.  
xx Interview with security guard, Freetown, 23 January 2009.  
xxi Interview with ex-combatant, Kenema, 13 September 2008.  
xxii Interview with security guard, Freetown, 23 January 2009. 
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This confidence in the power of the vote contrasts sharply with the state of affairs 
under the pre-war one-party system. So too does the attendant level of political 
awareness among Sierra Leoneans, particularly youth, which serves to ensure the 
actions of leaders and government receives public scrutiny. Indeed, some have 
commented that a positive outcome of the conflict was the political education of the 
people; citizens have developed a sense of rights and entitlement, and the resolve that 
things must change.xxiii Even apparent incidents of ‘votes for sale’ in the 2007 
election reflected this new attitude; many who collected money for casting their ballot 
actually voted for their patron’s opponent.17 The tables had been turned on the 
politicians.  
 
The use of the vote in this way represents the incorporation of public distrust into the 
political system. Sierra Leoneans no longer have to simply hope that ministers will 
fulfil their obligations; they are increasingly able to trust the democratic system to 
punish them if they do not. Beyond the formal mechanisms of the democratic system, 
checks and balances are also developing in the guise of public protest and political 
lobbying. A pertinent example was a move by Sierra Leonean youth groups in 
January 2009 to pressure the government into reviving the establishment of a 
National Youth Commission, a body proposed as early as 2003 and promised in the 
2007 election campaign.18 After lobbying ministers with little success, the National 
Youth Coalition (NYC) gave the government a forty-five day ultimatum to respond 
before it established its own parallel commission. Press conferences bringing the 
issue to public attention were held. This move generated significant media coverage, 
and the President himself was forced to intervene in the matter.19 As an act of 
monitoring and regulation, this incident demonstrated government could not afford to 
ignore political protest and that ministers were not simply being trusted to deliver 
promises, they were being actively compelled.  
 
Through these formal and informal mechanisms of political accountability, the 
traditional patrimonial method of government, largely based on the bypassing of 
public sentiment, is being replaced by a rational-legalistic model, whereby the 
                                                 
xxiii This sentiment was widely expressed, including by a UNDP youth programme officer in Freetown, 
10 September 2008; a Member of Parliament in Freetown, 11 September 2008; a group of ex-
combatants in Kenema, 13 September 2008, and the head of a youth empowerment NGO in Freetown, 
29 January 2009. 
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regulatory power of the system renders government dependent on public trust. No 
more clearly is this formalising trend illustrated than in the decision by President 
Koroma, following his 2007 electoral victory, to have ministers sign performance 
contracts, setting targets which if not met, would result in their removal from office.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
The issue of trust lies at the heart of Sierra Leone’s future development. Seven years 
after the conflict, cynicism towards government and leaders remains high, and the 
belief that all Sierra Leoneans need to change ‘bad attitudes’ is commonplace. 
However, although the task given to political leaders of building trust in government 
is daunting, it is not insurmountable; indeed there exist signs that a transformation is 
taking place in the way political trust itself is understood. Traditional exclusionary 
systems of patrimony, where trust is placed in the power of money and the patronage 
of friends and family, are gradually being eroded by a trust in rational-legalistic 
frameworks. This process will gain momentum if political cynicism continues to be 
channelled positively through its incorporation into mechanisms of regulation and 
accountability. Increasing confidence in the power of the vote and political protest are 
steps in building such mechanisms and an associated trust in government. Greater 
public oversight of government and the ability of Sierra Leoneans to hold politicians 
to account will further serve to encourage the emergence of political leaders capable 
of earning public trust. Ultimately, it is the example of such leaders that can do most 
to transform attitudes and build trust across Sierra Leone.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1 This article is informed by interviews carried out between September 2008 and March 2009 in Bo, 
Freetown, Kailahun, Kenema and Makeni. Those interviewed represent a cross-section of Sierra 
Leonean society, ranging from unemployed ex-combatants to senior political figures in both urban and 
rural areas. International donor, NGO and UN staff were also interviewed extensively. Reflecting the 
demographics of Sierra Leone, the majority of those interviewed were below the age of 35. To protect 
the identity of those interviewed, names have been changed. 
2 The TRC noted that colonialists used ‘commerce, Christianity and notions of ‘civilisation’’ to 
‘manipulate the relationships among the indigenous peoples’, sowing ‘seeds of distrust, competition 
and intransigence’ within the country. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, Vol.3A, 
Ch.1, item 10. 
3 See Richards, Fighting for the Rainforest. 
4 See Keen, Conflict and Collusion. 
5 For an overview of problems of distrust caused by blurred lines of division, see Keen, Conflict and 
Collusion. 
6 The reintegration element of the official DDR programme in Sierra Leone was severely flawed. 
However, through informal social-processes, most ex-combatants have successfully reintegrated. See 
Humphreys & Weinstein, What the Fighters Say.   
7 A youth officer working with young men in East Freetown commented that although former RUF 
could not be easily identified in the streets, ‘whenever there is a commotion, these boys are the angriest 
and you will see it, because they are all very, very angry inside. They feel betrayed.’ Interview, 
Freetown, 29 January 2009. 
8 In most interviews, expectations of what the new government could deliver appeared unrealistic, at 
least in the short-term. This underlines the importance of managing expectations, and in so doing, 
managing trust. For many, it was election promises made during the 2007 campaign that had misled 
them over the capacity of government. 
9 See Mitton, Engaging Disengagement..  
10 See Utas, Watermelon Politics in Sierra Leone. 
11 One senior political figure saw recruitment of militias as an integral part of safeguarding democracy. 
Interview, Kenema, 14 September 2008. 
12 In March 2009, the SLPP headquarters were violently ransacked by APC supporters, catching 
international media attention and sparking fears of escalation. 
13 The APC has traditionally drawn support from the northern Temne regions; the South and East are 
predominantly Mende and remain SLPP heartlands. In the 2007 second round of voting, Charles 
Margai, former SLPP member and leader of the PMDC, encouraged his predominantly Mende 
supporters to side with the APC, thus bringing a departure from traditional regional voting patterns.   
14 During his inaugural speech, President Koroma recognised corruption as inherently attitudinal: ‘A 
critical examination of the way of life indicates that corruption lies in our attitudes, and unless we 
change our attitudes we shall never be able to create the peaceful, progressive and prosperous country 
we dream about and wish to build.’ Presidential Inaugural Speech, Freetown, 15 November 2007. 
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15 In what the International Crisis Group, A New Era of Reform?, described as ‘a bold and controversial 
interpretation of the NEC’s statutory powers’, Thorpe invalidated the results of 477 polling stations 
because they returned more votes than they had registered voters. Virtually all were in the southern 
SLPP heartlands. It is important to note that Thorpe remains unpopular with some SLLP supporters 
who blame her for damaging the party’s electoral chances. However, the perceived integrity of her 
action was cited as reason for the high esteem in which the majority of those interviewed, including 
SLPP supporters, held her. 
16 President Koroma established an Attitudinal and Behavioural Change (ABC) campaign following 
his election; the campaign has struggled to move beyond rhetoric to practical measures, and has been 
criticised for focusing on ordinary Sierra Leoneans rather than ministers themselves. See ICG, A New 
Era of Reform? pp20-21. 
17 Mats Utas rightly views this development as ‘central to Sierra Leone’s democratic progression’. 
Utas, Watermelon Politics in Sierra Leone.  
18 A senior civil servant in the Ministry of Youth, Education and Sports confirmed that significant 
work on the National Youth Commission had already  been undertaken behind the scenes; interview, 
Freetown, 29 January 2009. Nevertheless, the National Youth Coalition was instrumental in bringing 
the issue back to the political fore.   
19 The question of trust lay at the heart of events. According to a press release by a coalition of youth 
groups and youth serving agencies on 7 January 2009, the Minister of Information and Communication 
had described the NYC as ‘groups of people who are seeking to gain employment for their personal 
interest rather than the general interest of all youths in the country.’ Some youth leaders likewise felt 
that ministers could not be trusted to treat youth issues with appropriate concern without the direct 
intervention of the President. Interview, head of Sierra Leone Youth Employment Organization, 
Freetown, 29 January 2009. 
